Qui Tam: Is False Claims Law a Model for International Law? by Carrington, Paul D.
Qui Tam: Is False Claims Law a Model for
International Law?
Paul D. Carringtont
I. CAUSES OF CORRUPT GOVERNMENT
Benjamin Franklin observed that "[t]here is no kind of dis-
honesty into which otherwise good people more easily and fre-
quently fall than that of defrauding the government."' This was
so in his time and it is so in ours because to many citizens the
government is a distant anonymity having no moral claim upon
themselves.2 If money can be made by chiseling a distant ano-
nymity, why not?
Moreover, many citizens sense that the line of moral conduct
for those in public service is not always clearly drawn. The faint
and sometimes indiscernible line between a campaign contribu-
tion and a bribe is a premier contemporary American example of
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Croatia, and in 2011 to the Rockefeller Conference on Transnational Corruption in Bel-
lagio, Italy. Research and editorial assistance was provided by Nir Schnaiderman, LLM
Class of 2011, Duke University.
1 Benjamin Franklin (writing as "B.F."), Letter to the Editor, On Smuggling, And Its
Various Species, London Chronicle (Nov 24, 1767), reprinted in Jared Sparks, 2 The
Works of Benjamin Franklin 361 (Hilliard Gray 1836). See generally Benjamin Franklin,
Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania (Griffiths 1759).
2 See, for example, Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Liberty 1976)
(E.G. West, ed) (originally published 1759). Smith gave the example of an epic earth-
quake causing much of Asia to fall into the sea. He and his neighbors in Glasgow would
"first of all express very strongly [their] sorrow for the misfortune," then reflect on the
chances of life, retire, and "snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hun-
dred million of [their] brethren." See id at Chap 111.1.46.
27
HeinOnline  -- 2012 U. Chi. Legal F. 27 2012
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
this lack of clarity.3 Even our present Supreme Court Justices
are grievously confused by that difference. 4
Family interests, longstanding friendships, cultural or sub-
cultural connections, and political alliances supply other sources
of improprieties in government.5 China, for an extreme example,
faces a special problem because of the deep cultural tradition of
guanxi.6 In that tradition, if your great-uncle did a favor for my
great-grandfather, I still owe you one. American government is
spared that impediment, but encounters plenty of others. Thus,
for example, a citizen or firm tempted to corrupt one public offi-
cial is likely to be willing to bribe others who are responsible for
enforcing laws against bribery, especially if they are politically
aligned with the primary beneficiaries of their bribes. So infec-
tions can spread quickly.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH FALSE CLAIMS LAW
Because new and enlarged military expenditures in time of
war are especially vulnerable to corruption, the Civil War
brought an epidemic of public corruption scandals rising to the
cabinet level.7 This led to the enactment of the law that became
known as "Lincoln's law." Lincoln's law was modeled on the Eng-
lish and colonial tradition known by its Latin name, qui tam law.
It sought to deter fraud by providing generous rewards for the
3 See generally Andrew Stark, Conflict of Interest in American Public Life 152-77
(Harvard 2000). See also Caperton v A.T Massey Coal Co, 556 US 868 (2009) (holding
that due process of law requires disqualification of a judge receiving from a litigant mil-
lions of dollars in campaign contributions).
4 See generally Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S Ct 876 (2010)
(reflecting the view of the Court that campaign contributions are free speech, not bribery,
even when made by business firms to advance business interests).
5 For an especially powerful example, see Alan Smart and Carolyn L. Hsu, Corrup-
tion or Social Capital? Tact and the Performance of Guanxi in Market Socialist China, in
Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders, eds, Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal
Anthropological Perspective 167 (Ashgate 2007).
6 See Jun Lin and Steven X. Si, Can Guanxi Be A Problem? Contexts, Ties, and Some
Unfavorable Consequences of Social Capital in China, 27 Asia Pac J Mgmt 561, 573-74
(2010) (arguing that the guanxi tradition, coupled with China's particular economic con-
ditions, lead to rent-seeking behavior in interactions with government and among gov-
ernment officials).
7 See Henry Scammell, Giantkillers: The Team and the Law that Help Whistle-
Blowers Recover America's Stolen Billions 37-38 (Atlantic Monthly 2004). President Lin-
coln dismissed the Secretary of War in 1862 for paying his friends twice the market price
for cavalry horses that turned out to be afflicted with "every disease horse flesh is heir
to." Id at 38.
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whistleblowing private citizen initiating a successful action
against one who defrauded a Union official.8
Numerous citizens then came forward as relators to pursue
claims on behalf of the United States against contractors who
were proven to have sold the Union army rifles without triggers,
gunpowder diluted with sand, or uniforms that could not endure
a single rainfall.9 The Union Army was thus in part funded by
payments made by malefactors to satisfy judgments rendered in
favor of the United States in proceedings brought by whistle-
blowers or to settle such claims.
After the Civil War, Lincoln's law fell into disuse. The law
was not invoked during the War with Spain, World War I, or,
with one exception, World War 11.10 The larcenous practices of
government suppliers continued through wars in Korea and
Vietnam. Many American soldiers in Vietnam were killed with
munitions made by the Vietnamese from bombs that had failed
to explode when dropped on them by American planes." The De-
partment of Defense of course had diverse officers tasked with
resisting fraud by those from whom it was buying lousy weapons,
but they were often outmanned by private weapon designers who
sold them disappointing products at the highest possible price.
Yet, for a century no claim was brought by or on behalf of the
United States against a supplier of defective weapons. During
the Cold War, ever more elaborate weaponry was sold to the
United States at ever rising prices.
By the 1980s, many of the largest defense contractors were
under investigation for defrauding the Department of Defense.
Four defense contractors-General Electric, GTE (which was lat-
er assimilated into Verizon), Rockwell, and Gould were indicted
and convicted of criminal fraud.12 But the Department of Justice
8 See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States of Mar 2, 1863, "Federal False Claims Act," 12 Stat 696-99, codified as amended at
31 USC §§ 3729-33 (2006).
' Scammell, Giantkillers at 36 (cited in note 7) (describing the "shoddy" equipment
provided to the Union army).
10 There was apparently an exception in 1943 leading to the enactment of an
amendment to the statute to require that the relator be an "original source" of the infor-
mation giving rise to the claim. See Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat 608-09 (1943),
codified as amended at 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
n See, for instance, Scammell, Giantkillers at 45 (cited in note 7). A case involving
the misfiring of a weapon in Cambodia reached the Supreme Court. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc v Challoner, 423 US 3 (1975).
12 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Dates of Consideration and Passage as
Reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 2-3
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266-303 (listing these transgressions as evidence for
29
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(DOJ) had many more such cases than it could handle. Senator
Charles Grassley, a Republican from Iowa, took a keen interest
in the problem. 1 3 The result of his initiative was a revival and
revision of Lincoln's law. The False Claims Act was redrafted by
public-interest lawyers and the DOJ and signed by President
Reagan on the eve of the 1986 congressional election, despite
desperate protests by the defense-industry lobbyists. 14
That 1986 version of the False Claims Act provided for the
recovery of treble damages for defrauding the United States,
with 15 to 25 percent of the recovery to be paid to the private
citizen who filed the suit. As under the English law known to
colonists, proceedings under the Act are not criminal proceed-
ings. Hence proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not required; a
"preponderance of proof" will, if credited, suffice to support a
judgment against the defendant. And pursuant to the 1938 Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, full use may be made of the right
in civil cases to compel disclosure by an adversary of possible
evidence and to compel non-party witnesses to supply their evi-
dence as well. 15 So the whistleblower can conduct an investiga-
tion much the same as that available to the government lawyers.
Furthermore, most of the government's files are exposed to pri-
vate investigation as a result of the 1966 Freedom of Information
Act. 16 When a citizen-relator files a False Claims action, the DOJ
is entitled to prompt notice and holds the right to intervene to
take control of the proceeding.17 But even if it does, the case con-
tinues as a civil action, and the relator remains a party.18 And if
the DOJ does not intervene, the relator is entitled to maintain
the action in the name of the United States.' 9
Such an independent relator may of course be represented
by a lawyer serving for a fee contingent on his or her success. 20 If
the need for an amendment).
13 Id at 12.
14 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-562, 100 Stat 3153, codi-
fied as amended at 31 USC § 3729 et seq (2006).
' See FRCP 16-37 (outlining rules for: litigation management, identifying parties,
joinder of claims, joinder of parties, interpleader, class actions, intervention, party substi-
tution, duties to disclose in discovery, depositions, and interrogatories).
16 See Freedom of Information Act, Pub L No 89-554, 80 Stat 383 (1966), codified as
amended at 5 USC § 552 (2000).
17 See 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
8 See 31 USC § 3730(c)(1).
to See 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
20 For an explanation of the origins of this unusual tradition, see generally Maxwell
Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876 (Harvard 1976); F.B.
MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services: A Study of Professional Economics and
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the relator and his or her counsel are successful in proving fraud
on the government without the help of the DOJ, they are then
entitled to receive at least 25 percent of the treble damages pro-
ceeds, plus reimbursement for costs including attorneys' fees.21
And if the citizen and his or her lawyer are unsuccessful in prov-
ing the case, there is, pursuant to the familiar "American Rule"
not observed in most other nations, ordinarily no liability for the
legal expenses of the defense. 22
While the law requires a relator to be an "original source,"23
pursuant to a 2009 amendment of the Act,24 a relator is not de-
nied compensation when a case commenced by him or her is won
by the government on proof other than evidence that he or she
brought to the court.2 5 Necessarily, most relators are employees
or former employees of the defendants whose conduct as whistle-
blower is not appreciated by their employers. So the law also
provides the relator with rights protecting him or her from retal-
iation by an employer. 26 But the federal law does not empower
the relator to sue a corrupt public officer who received some or
all of a bribe paid to secure a contract fraudulently obtained by
the firm. The reasons for this limitation are obscure.
In 2006, the law rewarding whistleblowers was extended by
the United States to reward private enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Code.27 No longer does the government rely solely on
the beleaguered and understaffed Internal Revenue Service to
collect federal taxes. In 2009, the 1986 Act was amended to fur-
Responsibilities (Aldine 1964).
21 See 31 USC § 3730(d)(2) (designating that an individual who proceeds with an
FCA claim that the government does not pursue may receive "not less than 25 percent
and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement").
22 For an account of the origins of this distinctive "American Rule," see generally
John Leubsdorf, Toward A History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L &
Contemp Probs 9 (1984).
23 See 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
24 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-21, 123 Stat 1617
(2009), codified at 31 USC §§ 3729-33 (2010).
25 This amendment reverses the holding in Rockwell International Corp v United
States, 549 US 457, 476-77 (2007).
26 See 31 USC § 3730(h) (2010) ("Any employee ... shall be entitled to all relief nec-
essary to make that employee ... whole, if that employee ... is discharged, demoted,
suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the
terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . in
furtherance of an action under this section.").
27 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Div A, Title IV, § 406 ("Awards to
Whistleblowers"), Pub L No 109-432, 120 Stat 2922, 2958 (2006), codified at 26 USC
§ 7623(b) (2006).
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ther extend the role of the private law enforcer. 28 By 2011, over
seven thousand False Claims cases had been filed qui tam pur-
suant to the 1986 statute, and the government has recovered bil-
lions.29
Although historically the bulk of False Claims actions had
been targeted at those who provided goods or services to the mili-
tary, other industries came to be targets for qui tam claims. In
2008, a drugmaker settled four similar qui tam claims for $431
million; its liability arose from promotion of its drug for uses that
were not medically approved. Its promotions led to its improvi-
dent purchase by many patients supported by the federal Medi-
caid program and thus costing the United States many dollars.30
In 2009, the United States settled a claim against Pfizer for its
fraudulent practices in selling medicines to government
healthcare programs for a payment of $2.1 billion. The primary
whistleblower, a former officer of Pfizer, was rewarded with a fee
of $50 million. 31 In 2010, the DOJ recovered over $3 billion in
False Claims cases; of that sum, $2.5 billion came from drug
companies and other healthcare providers. 32 Most of those claims
were brought to the DOJ by private whistleblowers, some of
whom became rich citizens as a result of their efforts.
An illustrative recent case is one brought against the Uni-
versity of Phoenix, an institution seeking profit by providing
higher education at diverse local campuses and on the internet.
Established in 1976, the University currently serves over
300,000 students.33 The two relators in a recent case were women
hired by the University as part-time counselors to recruit stu-
28 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-21, 123 Stat 1617.
For a brief description of the law's effects, see Jesse Lee, Protecting Homeowners, Protect-
ing the Economy, White House Blog (May 20, 2009), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov
Iblog/Protecting-Homeowners-Protecting-the-Economy (visited Sept 10, 2012).
29 See DOJ, Fraud Statistics-Overview (Dec 2011), online at http://www.justice.gov/
civil/docs forms/C-FRAUDS FCAStatistics.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
30 See Shannon P. Duffy, Cephalon to Pay $431 Million to Settle Whistleblower Suits,
Legal Intelligencer (Sept 30, 2008); Ed Wallis, Whistleblowers Receive Awards from Jus-
tice Settlement, MidSouth Trial Lawyer (Oct 2, 2008), online at http:/www.midsouth
triallawyer.com/2008/10/02/whistleblowers-receive-awards-from-justice-settlement/ (visit-
ed Sept 10, 2012).
31 See Chris Rizo, Pfizer Agrees to $2.3 Billion Settlement over Off-Label Marketing,
Legal Newsline (Sept 2, 2009), online at http://www.legalnewsline.cominews/222684-
pfizer-agrees-to-2.3-billion-settlement-over-off-label-marketing (visited Sept 10, 2012).
32 See Taxpayers Against Fraud, False Claims Act Update and Alert, (Oct 25, 2010),
online at http://www.taf.org/whistle295.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012) (listing major False
Claims cases and their estimated settlements for Fiscal Year 2010).
33 Sam Dillon, Troubles Grow for a University Built on Profits, NY Times Al (Feb 11,
2007).
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dents to enroll in its diverse degree programs. 34 They were paid
"per student" that each recruited, without regard for the enrol-
lees' academic qualifications or success in the Phoenix program. 35
It was alleged that few of those entering the University complet-
ed the first year of their program. Most of those who enrolled had
borrowed from the Department of Education the money they
used to pay tuition, and seldom were the loans repaid. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the University had misled the Department of
Education to induce it to provide financial aid to students who
were unlikely to repay their debts.36 The DOJ took over the case
and settled it in 2009 for $78.5 million. 37 The government recov-
ered $67.5 million, and the remaining $11 million was divided
among the two employees and their counsel.38
Complaints are voiced by defendants and perhaps others
about our reliance on, and our rewarding of, such employees.
Necessarily, most private enforcers of public laws prohibiting
corrupt practices are unfaithful employees. Complaints are also
heard that regulating business decisions ex post is not economi-
cally efficient.39 The costs of private enforcement are high, and
inefficient conduct may only sometimes be deterred. 40 But pri-
vate enforcement under the False Claims Act seems to be more
effective than the theoretically more efficient alternatives aiming
to prevent harm to government by regulating business with rules
and regulations enforced by federal, state, or local officials who
can tell executives in advance what risks they are forbidden to
take. Among the limits of ex ante regulation of corrupt practices
is the risk that the business regulators may themselves be cor-
rupt.41
3 See United States v University of Phoenix, 461 F3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir 2006), affd
by Hendow v University of Phoenix, 296 Fed Appx 587 (9th Cir 2008).
3 See University of Phoenix, 461 F3d at 1169.
36 See id.
3 See Doug Lederman, $78.5M Settles U. of Phoenix Case, (Inside Higher Ed Dec 15,
2009), online at http://www.insidehighered.comlnews/2009/12/15/Apollo (visited Sept 10,
2012).
38 See id. For an account of the negotiation, see Dawn Gilbertson, Recruiter Lawsuit
May Get Closure, Ariz Republic B1 (Oct 4, 2009). Other citizen relators have now joined
the cause. See, for example, United States v University of Phoenix, 2011 WL 4971979 (ED
Ca 2011) (case pursued by new plaintiffs Hoggett and Good).
3 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law 265 (Harvard 1987).
40 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The 'Principles'Paradox, 10 Eur Bus Org L Rev
175 (2009); Shavell, Accident Law at 265-70 (cited in note 39).
41 See Saul M. Froomkin, Money Laundering and Crime Management: Money Laun-
dering, Corruption and the Proceeds of Crime-An International Reality Check, 4 Asper
Rev Intl Bus & Trade L 155, 164 (2004).
3
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The United States does, of course, have a competent DOJ re-
sponsible for the enforcement of federal law, and it can some-
times detect a fraud without the help of a whistleblower, and can
assert many such claims as civil actions for breach of contract.
And the notices of filings by whistleblowers must sometimes, and
perhaps often, be a nuisance to the government lawyer assigned
to consider its possible merit. But the prospects for detection of
fraud are much less and the cost of investigation needed to make
public enforcement effective is much greater when there is no
whistleblower to initiate and assist in the presentation of the
claim. And ex ante public law regulation to prevent corrupt prac-
tices requires public officials who are resistant to capture by
those with money or power. It is also a consideration that the ex
post method of private regulation to deter fraud on the govern-
ment may allow corporate management a measure of freedom in
making business decisions about dealing with bureaucracies. 42
There are complaints that some or many False Claims cases
are frivolous results of failed employment relationships. While
many False Claims complaints are shown to lack merit, just as
many private securities fraud claims are found to lack merit,
there appears to be no evidence that the proportion is not excep-
tional. Of course, the DOJ, like the SEC in assessing cases, 4 3
tends to take over the strongest cases filed by the relators, and
leaves only weaker ones to be pursued by the relator and his or
her private contingent fee lawyer.44 Still, some of those cases left
to the relator and the contingent fee lawyer are won, and some
are settled. 45 Even if it is not without diverse costs and is certain-
ly not completely effective, private enforcement of bribery law by
False Claims actions is indispensable in the United States.
On this premise, the federal Medicaid law now provides an
incentive for states to enact similar False Claims laws; states
42 For a sober reflection on the issue, see generally Valerie P. Hans, Business on
Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (Yale 2000).
43 See Amanda M. Rose, The Multi-Enforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence,
158 U Pa L Rev 2173, 2201 (2010).
44 It is reported that the United States intervened in 809 cases and declined to do so
in 2,858 cases filed between 1987 and 2005. Christina 0. Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Pro-
visions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 Colum L Rev 949, 971 (2007).
If the government intervened, 94 percent of the cases settled or the government won at
judgment; if it did not, 6 percent settled or the relator won. Id at 974.
45 See generally David Kwok, Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?
Evidence from the False Claims Act (unpublished working paper, University of California,
Berkeley, 2011), online at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1832934
(visited Sept 10, 2012) (finding evidence to suggest that private and government enforce-
ment of False Claims Act suits work in "cooperative equilibrium").
34 [ 2012
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enacting laws meeting the federal requirements receive a larger
federal subsidy for the cost of enforcement of laws enacted to de-
ter fraud by drug companies and nursing facilities selling their
services to Medicaid beneficiaries.46 This author played a small
role in persuading North Carolina to enact such a law. Taxpayers
Against Fraud is a nonprofit organization in Washington that
serves the public good by promoting such legislation and lending
help to lawyers advising and representing relators. 47
III. INTERNATIONAL CORRUPT PRACTICES LAW
This American system of private enforcement to combat cor-
ruption should be adapted to the international marketplace. The
World Bank could provide an international arbitral forum for the
enforcement of the many international conventions binding the
ratifying nations to prohibit corrupt practices in international
trade. Such conventions have recently been ratified by almost
every nation,4 8 China being the one very important exception.
These international conventions originated with a federal law
enacted as a gesture in Cold War politics, 49 but its policy has
since been vigorously promoted by the International Chamber of
Commerce5 0 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
46 For a map of the states that have enacted false claims statutes, see the False
Claims Act Resource Center website, authored by the law firm of Pietragallo, Gordon,
Alfano, Bosick, and Raspanti, online at http://www.falseclaimsact.comisfca-overview.php
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
47 For more on Taxpayers Against Fraud in general, see the organization's website at
http://www.taf.org (visited Sept 10, 2012). According to Taxpayers Against Fraud, § 6031
of the federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-171, 120 Stat 4, 72-73 (2005),
codified at 42 USC § 1396h, incentivizes states to enact false claims statutes so that they
may share in federal revenue recovered from instances of Medicaid fraud.
48 See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 Mich J
Intl L 129, 160 (2010).
49 The SEC initiated the policy in 1976. See SEC, 94th Cong, Report on Questionable
and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices submitted to the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs at *13 (Comm Print 1976). The law imposing crimi-
nal sanctions on American firms or foreign firms registered on an American stock ex-
change was enacted in 1977. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat
1495 (1977), codified at 15 USC §§ 78dd-1 et seq (2006). See also J. Ndumbe Anyu, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Catalyst for Global Corruption Reform 50-75 (Publi-
shAmerica 2006) (describing the background and enactment history of the FCPA).
50 In 1978 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) promulgated its Rules of
Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery. The Rules were amended in 1996 and again in
2005. On their current content, see ICC Commission on Corporate Responsibility and
Anti-corruption, Major Changes Brought by the 2005 Revision of the ICC Rules of Conduct
and Recommendations to Combat Extortion and Bribery, Doc No 194/51 (ICC 2005),
online at http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2004/Major-
changes-brought-by-the-2005-revision-of-the-ICC-Rules-of-Conduct-and-Recommendation
s-to-Combat-Extortion-and-Bribery (visited Sept 10, 2012). For the history of the Rules,
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Development (OECD), a group of nations providing economic aid
to developing nations in hope of strengthening the global econo-
my.5 1 Grave as the problem of corruption is in the United States,
it is surely more acute in developing nations whose officials are
impecunious and less frequently committed to the morality of
loyalty and public service. 52 Other institutions also promoting
the ratification of such international conventions include the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Na-
tions, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International
Bar Association, and special non-governmental institutions such
as Transparency International and Global Witness. Corrupt
practices are a substantial impediment to the economic develop-
ment of weakly governed nations.
By stages, the DOJ has become increasingly aggressive in
enforcing the federal law prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.53
The Halliburton Company disgorged $559 million in 2009 to the
federal Treasury as punishment for its corrupt practices in Nige-
ria.5 4 In 2008, the German firm Siemens paid a fine of $1.6 bil-
lion to settle prosecutions for paying bribes and kickbacks to win
contracts (1) from Iraq's government in the United Nation's oil-
for-food program, (2) with Venezuela to win projects including
commuter rail construction, (3) with Bangladesh to erect mobile
see Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International
Norms 128-29 (ABA 2005).
51 See OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions and Related Documents Art 1.1 at 7 (OECD 2011), online
at http: //www.oecd.org/daflbriberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/380280
44.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012). See also Deming, New International Norms at 95-100
(cited in note 50).
52 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice 158-
59 (Norton 2006); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 59-71
(Yale 1969). See generally Leslie Holmes, Rotten States: Corruption, Post-Communism
and Neoliberalism (Duke 2006); Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook on
the Economics of Corruption (Elgar 2006). But a nation need not have vast natural re-
sources to have a problem with the corruption of underpaid judges. See, for example,
Jennifer A. Widner, Building the Rule of Law 273-90 (Norton 2001).
53 See, for example, 26 USC § 162(c)(1) (making deductions for bribes paid to foreign
officials illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). For a chronicle of the legislative
history, see Donald R. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1-12
(ABA 2d ed 1999).
54 The company paid $382 million to the DOJ and $177 million to the SEC. See Hal-
liburton Company, Press Release, Halliburton Announces Settlement of Department of
Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investi-
gations (Feb 11, 2009), online at http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press
release/2009/corpnws02 1109.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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phone networks, (4) with Israel to build power plants, and (5)
with Russia to construct traffic-control systems. 5
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes no provision for
enforcement by private citizens serving as relators. But there are
cases in which bribery of a foreign official has been perceived to
violate the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act,56 and thus entitles the victim who failed to win a contract to
compensation for the lost profit.5 7 And unlawful bribery is also a
violation of the tort law of most states if it causes foreseeable
harm to a business competitor or others.58 As Judge Richard
Posner observed, "commercial bribery is a deliberate tort, and
one way to deter it is to make it worthless to the tortfeasor by
stripping away all his gain, since if his gain exceeded the victim's
loss a damages remedy would leave the tortfeasor with a profit
from his act."59 Punitive damages are also a possibility.
IV. THE NEED FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
But while the commitment to prevent and deter the corrup-
tion of foreign governments is almost universal, few governments
have demonstrated a willingness and ability to enforce their laws
enacted to protect foreign governments. The problem was dra-
matically illustrated in 2006 by the weakness of the British gov-
ernment's effort to enforce its law against a domestic manufac-
turer of military aircraft for bribing officials of Saudi Arabia to
5s See SEC, Press Release, SEC Charges Seimens AG for Engaging in Worldwide
Bribery (Dec 15, 2008), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm (visit-
ed Sept 10, 2012).
56 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 USC §§ 1961-
68 (2006).
7 See, for example, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co v Environmental Techtronics Corp, 493
US 400, 409-10 (1990) (holding that the Act of State doctrine does not bar private claims
under RICO). See also Kensington International v Socidtd Nationale des Pjtroles du Con-
go, 2006 WL 846351, *9 (SDNY) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a RICO claim).
58 See, for example, Korea Supply Co v Lockheed Martin Corp, 63 P3d 937, 958-59
(Cal 2003) (holding that defendant competitor, who had bribed a foreign customer, could
be liable for the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage).
5 Williams Electronics Games, Inc v Garrity, 366 F3d 569, 576 (7th Cir 2004). But
see Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for Corruption in Government Contracting: Zero Tol-
erance Versus Proportional Liability (New York University School of Law Public Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper No 09-22, Apr 2009), online at
http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1393326 (visited Sept 10, 2012) (ad-
vocating a proportional liability approach, rather than a zero-tolerance approach, to deal
with bribery).
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induce them to purchase its products.60 Prime Minister Blair
took responsibility for ordering the prosecution to drop the case
in deference to the interests of British investors and workers who
would benefit from the contract secured by bribery. 61 In 2010, the
offending manufacturer was at last required to pay a modest
fine. 6 2 As in Britain, few governments accountable to voters are
aggressive enforcers of laws depriving their citizen-investors and
workers of the benefits of contracts with foreign governments
merely to prevent the bribery of foreign officials.
This political disability shared by most modern nations re-
sembles the disabilities of American governments that gave rise
to the system of private enforcement of public laws that emerged
in this country in the nineteenth century. Indeed, qui tam laws
would not work in the courts of most nations without substantial
reforms of their civil procedure to empower private plaintiffs
with discovery, the contingent fee, and the "American Rule."6 3
American courts and the American legal profession became
accustomed to private enforcement of many public laws in the
nineteenth century. The custom was in place with "Lincoln's law"
and was entrenched by the 1895 enactment of antitrust law
awarding treble damages to the private enforcer. 64 Accordingly,
most laws regulating business in the United States are not en-
tirely dependent on government prosecutors or other government
attorneys.
Most critical to the development of private law enforcement
is the "American Rule" shielding the losing plaintiff from liability
for the legal expenses of a prevailing defendant. 65 In most na-
tions, a successful defendant would be entitled to impose the
costs of the defense on the unsuccessful plaintiff.6 6 That rule
60 See Barefaced: Corruption and the Law, Economist 18 (Dec 23, 2006).
61 See Heather Timmons and Eric Pfanner, Blair Defends Ending of Graft Inquiry;
Investigation of Saudi Arms Deal a National Security Risk, He Says, Intl Herald Trib 3
(Dec 16, 2006).
62 See Christopher Drew and Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Allegations of Bribery, NY
Times B1 (Feb 6, 2010).
63 For a general comparison of American civil procedure to that found in other legal
regimes, see generally James R. Maxeiner, Failures of American Civil Justice in Interna-
tional Perspective (Cambridge 2011).
64 See An Act To Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and
Monopolies ("Sherman Act"), 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1-7
(2006).
65 See Leubsdorf, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 9 (cited in note 22).
66 See Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorney's Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-
Shifting Statutes, 68 U Chi L Rev 1007, 1009 (2001).
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serves to deter weak and frivolous cases, but also deters private
enforcement of public law.
Next is the contingent fee, 67 enabling the whistleblower to
proceed without responsibility for paying a fee to his or her law-
yer unless they win their case. Courts in few nations are open to
lawyers serving for such fees contingent on their success. Again,
this is so because few nations rely upon private enforcement of
laws regulating business practices.
And third, the whistleblower needs access to evidence in ad-
dition to his or her own testimony. Discovery, as we know that
procedure in the United States, 68 is indispensable to effective
private enforcement of many laws, but especially anticorruption
law. Corrupt practices are almost by definition secrets requiring
effective investigation that public officials may be reluctant to
pursue.
A fourth procedural device established in the United States
is the class action enabling the private plaintiff to aggregate the
claims of other victims of the same business malpractice. 69 That
device, first conceived by Professor Harry Kalven of the Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School, 70 enables small frauds to be assembled
in a mass of similar cases that can be resolved in a single pro-
ceeding. Variations on the class action have been adopted in the
courts of numerous other nations.7'
If False Claims proceedings brought by private whistleblow-
ers are to be employed to enforce the international law estab-
lished by the conventions ratified in the 1990s in courts outside
the United States, three procedural devices are indispensable.
They are the contingent fee, the American Rule, and discovery.
To make such procedures available will require the establish-
ment of a new forum with jurisdiction to hear whistleblowing
67 See Eleni Skordaki and Danielle Walker, Regulating and Charging for Legal Ser-
vices: An International Comparison 15-17 (Law Society 1994). See also Macinnon, Con-
tingent Fees for Legal Services (cited in note 20).
68 See FRCP 26-37, 45 (American procedural rules outlining discovery and subpoena
process).
69 See, for example, FRCP 23(b)(3) (describing the class action, wherein "questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members," and for which "a class action is superior to other available methods").
70 See Vincent Blasi, Harry Kalven Jr., 61 J Legal Educ 301, 304 (2011).
71 See, for example, Otto Cornelis Kaligis, Class Action Problems and Practical Solu-
tions (Asean Law Association 2006), online at http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/9GA
docs/Indonesia.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) (describing adoption of class action mechanism
in Indonesia); Lisa Rickard, The Class Action Debate in Europe: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, The World Financial Review, online at http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?
p=289 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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claims and civil procedure empowering private plaintiffs to en-
force public law.
The nearest model for such a forum is the International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, an institution estab-
lished and maintained by the World Bank.7 2 As it happens, the
World Bank has been much engaged in the political efforts lead-
ing to the drafting and ratification of the treaties obligating gov-
ernments to deter their citizens from corrupting other govern-
ments. The treaties have not been without effect on business
practices. The World Bank provides some enforcement of such
laws through its debarment procedure that disqualifies firms
found to have committed fraud on a government being aided by
the World Bank to be debarred for some time from participation
in future ventures funded by the World Bank.73
But the World Bank is involved in only a minor share of the
public projects that foreign firms might seek to secure by bribery
of responsible officials. The inevitable lack of enthusiasm of most
government lawyers around the world for the task of prosecuting
their local firms, managed by their fellow nationals, for bribing
the officials of a developing nation in order to secure a deal that
will return profits and employment opportunities to their fellow
nationals-is the elephant in the room. The disincentives to gov-
ernment prosecutors explain why the international conventions
ratified by so many nations in the 1990s must be seen as almost
empty gestures. Perhaps if someone other than government law-
yers were given an incentive to pursue claims to deter corrupt
practices and a forum were provided to facilitate private en-
forcement of corruption laws, the international law might be-
come a more realistic threat to those firms tempted to bribe for-
eign officials. That is the genius of the American system of pri-
vate enforcement embodied in the False Claims Act. It might
work on an international scale if the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and other organizations promoting
law against corruption in transnational trade choose to make it
SO.
72 See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 91 (Oxford
2010); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 Ga
J Intl & Comp L 47 (2009).
7 See Pascale Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat
Fraud & Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World
Bank's Sanctions System, 2012 U Chi Legal F 195, 227-28 (2012).
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